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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E. ~IECH"'\:\I, FRANK Y. .
NELSOX and LOlUX ~. PACE, ·~

-~LL)1_X

Plaintiffs-Appellants,~
Case No.

vs.

CO)I:\IISSION OF
TREASURER OF
THE STATE OF UTAH,

10-HO

ST~~\TE T~~X
T~~T1UI and

Defendants-Respondents.!

BRIEF OF RESPOND EN. r
S'l'ATE:\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The appellants, members of the 36th Utah State
Legislature and citizens of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, appeal from a judgment of the District Court
rif the Third .Judicial District, Honorable A. H.
Ellett, .T udge, ruling that House Bill No. 81, enacted
~r the 3f>th Utah State Legislature, providing for an
mcrease in the income tax effective for the taxable
year beginning .January 1, 1965, is constitutional.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The appellants filed a complaint, challenging the
constitutionality of House Bill No. 81, enacted bv th,
Utah State Legislature. Thereafter, an amended an~
second amended complaints were filed and the respondents filed an answer. On June 4, 1965, the trial court
entered its amended judgment of dismissal, finding that
House Bill No. 81, enacted by the 36th Utah State
Legislature, became effective .May 11, 1965, and was
not unconstitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondents submit that the decision of the
trial court should be affirmed.
STATE~1ENT

OF FACTS

The 36th Utah State Legislature enacted Houst
Bill No. 81 ( R. IO). This bill amended Sections 59-lH '
59-14-47, 59-14-67 and 59-14-70, Utah Code Annotated.
1953. The appellants challenge the constitutionalityof
the act insofar as it purports to raise the indiridual 1
income tax and impose the increased rates effectiw i
during the taxable year beginning January l, 1965
Section 5 of House Bill No. 81 (Laws of Ctah, 1965. '
Chapter 125, Section 5} provides:
"The tax rates provided for herein shall appl)·
to all returns filed on or after January 1, 196ti
for taxable rears commencing on or after Janu·
ary 1, 1965."

2

1

Although the pleadings of the parties do not discJo~e b\· 1Yhat margin of votes I-louse Bill No. 81 was
enacted, tbe House Journal of the 36th Legislature
,Jisdose;; that the bill passed by a vote of 40 yeas to
2.J. nays. with ti\·e members of the House of Representntin·s l•eing abseut. In the Senate, the bill passed by
Fi ye:1s awl 12 nays. The act had no special provision
iE'OYiding that it become effective at any other time
thau .\Jay 11, 1965, although it did provide, as noted
ah<ffe. for an increD.se in income taxes to be applied.
for the taxable year beginning January 1, 1965.
The appellants seek a determination that smce
Article ,-I. Sedirm 2.5, of the Constitution of the State
nt' I'tali provides that "[a]ll acts shall be officially
p11blisht-d_, and no act shall take effect until so published. uor until sixty days after the adjournment of
+he session at "-hich it passed, unless the Legislature
'•:· n 1·ott of two-thirds of all the members elected to
e:1d1 lio1Jse. shall otherwise direct'', the tax rate could
prir ·~rmstit11tio11al1y apply for the taxable year begin11111g Janiwry 1, 1965, or, at least, should not apply
pnn~ tn \fay 11, 1965, the effective date of the act,
heeause of the failure of the bill to be passed by a vote
of two-thirds of the members of each house.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DRTERl\IIXING THAT HOUSE BILL NO. 81.

3

AS ENACTED BY THE 36TH UTAH STATE
LEGISLATURE, 'VAS CONSTITUTIONAL
OR, AS RESPECTS ITS APPLICATION TO
THE INCOME TAX PAYABLE UNDER THE
ACT, THAT IT APPLIES TO THE TAXABLE
YEARS BEGINNING JANUARY 1, 1965.
The appellants contend that House Bill No. 81,
enacted by the 36th Utah State Legislature, on March
11, 1965, does not conform to the requirements of
Article VI, Section 25, of the Constitution of the State
of Utah, which requires:

"All acts shall be officially published, and no
act shall take effect until so published, nor until
sixty days after the adjournment of the sessiou ,
at which it passed, unless the Legislature by a
vote of two-thirds of all the members eleded tr:
each house, shall otherwise direct."

1

House Bill No. 81 provides that the increased rates
provided for therein "shall apply to all returns on or
after January 1, 1966 for taxable years commencing
on or after January 1, 1965." The act does not provide
for any special effective date.
The tax increase resulting from the act applies to
income earned during the taxable year commencing
January 1, 1965 before, up to and subsequent to the
passage of the act. It is because of this retroactive in·
clusion of income under the increased tax rates that
appellants claim that the bill, which did not become
effective until sixty days after the adjournment of th~

4

1

Le:.;i,Juture, ;s unconstitutional. Further, the appellants
coi;tewl that House Bill No. 81 was not intended to
8 ppl~ to ineome earned prior to the effective date of
tlie bill, or }lay 11, 1965.

It should be noted that the bill does not require
returns filed in 1965 to be subject to the increased rates
hut only returns filed on or after January 1, 1966, which
is after the effective date of the bill. Thus, the effective
date t'f the act is not changed beyond the sixty-day
period proYided in the Constitution, but the operative
etlect ut the ad proYides for retrospectiYe application.
It is ;mportant to note that the tax on income earned
in HHi.5 is not due and payable until the due date of
tlie 1!)fi.5 tax return on April 25, 1966. (Section 59H- 19. Utnh Code Annotated, 1953.)
It is not in dispute that House Bill No. 81 failed
t(, obtam the two-thirds necessary to impose an effective
,J;1te nther tlrnn that of sixty days after the adjournment
ili' ~he 1%5 Legislature. However, it is the respondents'
position that the act does not provide for any other
eifediYe date and that appellants confuse the question
of the effecfo·e date of the act with the scope or operation of the act. Respondents submit that House Bill
Xo. 81 did in fact become effective of .Mav 11, 1965.
To rule otherwise would render the statute unconstitional and the appellants' contention that the bill became
effective at some other period is neither legally nor
factually sound. In Blackrock Copper J.llining and
Milling Co. v. Tin,qey, 34 Utah 369, 98 Pac. 180 ( 1908),
thi5 Court stated:
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" * * * ['VJ e agam
. repeat, w hat this. court l1 .
so often declared, that, when an act or statute ~:
attacked upon the ground that it violates 801 :
provision of the Constitution or in some wa/
repugnant to the instrument, it must clearh."an'.
pear to be so, or the act or statute must be. hel1
valid. This doctrine applies with especial fore~
to a law which sets in motion a sovereian power
such as the power of taxation when it alleaed
that the Constitution prohibits the exerciseb of
the power. In such a case, unless it is made to
appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the sove·
reign power to impose taxes in a particular war
is withheld from the Legislature, the law irnpo;.
ing a particular tax must be upheld."

fs

In accord 'vith this view are the cases of Pleasant Grore
City v. Holman, 59 Utah 242, 202 Pac. 1096; Jackson
v. Bowneville Irr. District, 66 Utah 404, 243 Pac. 107:
Howe v. Tax Commission, 10 U.2d 362, 353 P.2d 568.
Such a ruling is only in keeping with the established
proposition that every presumption must be indulged
in favor of constitutionality. Thomas v. Daughtus of
Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477.
In view of the well established principle of statu·
tory and constitutional construction indicated above, il
is apparent that House Bill No. 81 had an effectire
date of May 11, 1965. It is, of course, reasonable for
House Bill No. 81 to have an effective date of Ma:1•
11, 1965, and still cause all persons covered by the ac:
to include in their 1966 income tax returns, at the in·
creased rates, the taxable income earned during the year
1965. This is merely another way of noting the di~·
6

tinction between retroactive operation of a statute and
retroactive effective date.
Although many states have adopted express constitutional provisions against retroactive laws 1 , Utah
has no such constitutional provision. In the absence of
such a constitutional provision, the general rule is that
retroactive laws are not prohibited. Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541. The clear meaning of Article VI, Section 25, of the Constitution of
the State of "Ctah, makes it apparent that it was adopted
only to govern the effective date of acts of the Legislature and not to prohibit retroactive laws. Thus, in
Garr"tt Frei,ght Lines v. Tax Commission, 103 Utah
390, 13.5 P .2d 523 ( 1943), this court observed:
"Neither the Federal Constitution nor the Utah
Constitution has any provision in terms prohibitmg retroactive legislation-excepting that which
forbids the enactment of ex post facto laws."

It is apparent from the Garrett Freight Lines case that
the appellants' argument, relating to the provisions of
Article VI, Section 25, is not applicable. It may be
argued that the Garrett Freight Lines case did not involve a situation where the Legislature had passed a
law for retrospective operation without two-thirds vote,
but it is apparent that the court felt that Article VI,
Section 25, did not inhibit an act being passed, effective
sixty days after the adjournment of the Legislature,

t· Colora~o

Constitution, Article II, Section 11; Idaho ConstituIX, Section 12; Montana Constitution, Article XV,

Article
siont"
ec ion 15.

7

which had retrospectiYe application, even though two.
thirds of the Legislature did not concur therein. Thei·
can be no doubt as to the right of the Legislature to iia.
£'Si
statutes which reach back, change, or modify the effect 01
prior transactions, providing there is no constitutionai
provision against retrospectiw law. Cooley, Constitu.
tional Limitation.s·, 8th Ed. ( 1937), page 772. If no spe·
cific constitutional prohibition to retrospectiYe laws exist.
the Legislature may enact prospective laws which hare
retroactive application. No constitutional objection
exists in Utah, and, hence, no prohibition exists prerenting House Bill No. 81 from having retrospective appli·
cation. Garrett Freight Lines v. Ta.r Commission, supra.
It is well established that a statute may haYe both
an effective date and an operative date. Generally. the
operative date is prospective but may, on occasion. be
retrospective. County of Los Anqeles v. LamlJ, tH Cal
196; TVilliams v. City of Vallejo, 36 Cal. App. 133,
171 Pac. 834; Callahan v. City and CounflJ of Su:1
Francisco, 68 Cal.App.2d 286, 156 P.2d 4nl; Was/1·
ington Oil Co. v. State, 159 S.,V.2d 57 (Texas). Gen·
erally, the effective date of legislation is that date fixed
by the Constitution, and, in the absence of a legislatire
intention to establish some other date, no other date
beyond the constitutional provision is effective. Portland-Pendleton Tran~portation Co. ·v. Devin, 26 Wash.
2d 333, 173 P.2d 994. In the instant case, it is apparent
that the Legislature intended no other effective date than
that provided by the Utah Constitution.
It is ·well established that a tax or revenue bill cai
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take effect prospectively but thereafter cause retroactive
tax liability to those effected by the passage of the act.
This was the situation before this Court in Garrett
Freight Lines v. Tax Commission, supra. In that case,
in 1841, the Utah Legislature enacted an excise tax
of iour cents per gallon on the use of diesel in the State
of Utah. The act was passed by the Legislature on
February 13, 1941, and, without question, became effective May 13, 1941. It purported to impose the tax on
the use of the fuel in the State on or after January I,
1941. The taxpayer asserted that the part of the act
which purported to impose a tax upon the use of fuel
prior to the effective of the act was invalid. Although the argument was based upon one of due process, it appears that the Court carefully considered
all the constitutional objections raised by the taxpayer
and, in discussing retrospective legislation, stated:
" 'If the Constitution does not expressly forbid
retrospective legislation, the Legislature may
impose a business tax up~n business done prior
to the time the statute was adopted.' 2 Cooley,
Taxation, 4th Ed., Sec. 522.

" 'In apportioning the tax between the individuals, there is no valid objection to making it
on consideration of a state of things that may
now have come to an end; as where a tax is imposed on the extent of one's business for the preceding year instead of upon an estimate of the
business for the year to come.' lb. Sec. 523, citing People v. Gold Co., 92 N.Y. 383; Drexel
v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. 31.

*
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*

*

"Appellant .concedes that i1~co~ne taxes ma
be ~ased t.1pon mcome earned w1thm a reason;il, 1:
p;r.10~ prior to the enadmeu~ ?f the taxing ;\lr
l lus is "·ell established b~· dec1s1ons of the Fnitrd
States Supreme Court and many state courk
\Vhile the specific questioll raised by the appellant,
was not directly passed upon by this Court, the fatt
remains that a revenue bill, passecl by the Ctah State
Legislature with an effective date of l\fay 13, Hlti±. '\a,
held to legally impose a tax retroactively from its cffte·
tive date to January l, 19.J<l. Further, the Court expressly noted no constitutional objection, either State
or Federal, prohibited such action. The legislation i!l
the instant case is no different from the statute in ti 1:
Garrett case insofar as its effective and operafre d:1lr
features are concerned.
In the case of 1¥elch v. HcnriJ, 305 U.S. I.'34, the
United States Supreme Court was presented "·ith an
analogous situation. A 1933 lVisconsin statute impo,ed
a tax upon net income in graduated rates. The taxpar
er's 19:33 income tax return and the tax for that year
were due and filed l\J arch 15, 193.J<. In 1935, the Wiscon·
sin Legislature increased tax liabilities for the year~
1933 and 1934 by means of an act effective .Jlarch 2i.
1935. The United States Supreme Court rejected a
challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, stating:

" * * * For more than seventv-five vears it ha.i
been the familiar legislative prdctice ~f Congre~i
in the enactment of revenue laws to tax retro·
actively income or profits receiYed during th:
year of the session in which the taxing statute Li
10

enacted, and in some instances during the year
of the preceding session."
Admittedly, this case did not deal with the same constitutional provision invoked by the appellants. HoweYer, it is apparent from this decision that the question
of operation of a statute may be entirely different from
the question of the effective date of the enactment.
In United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, the
lJnited States Supreme Court observed that it was a
uniform practice "to make" tax statutes "retroactive
for relatively short periods so as to include profits from
transactions consummated while the statute was in the
process of enactment, or within so much of the calendar
year as preceded the enactment." In almost every
Instance where this has been done by the state or Federal
legislatures, courts interpreting such statutes have stated
them to be effective at a date certain but held them
to include income earned prior to their enactment.
Clearly, this demonstrates the simple proposition, apparently not grasped by the appellants, that a statute
may have an effective date at one time but be sufficiently
broad in scope and operation to relate to previous periods.No case has been cited by the appellants, nor have
the respondents been able to find a case, holding that
a statute, which is retroactive in application or retrospective in its definition of taxable income, was unconstitutional for the reasons which appellants attack the
instant statute. The terms "retroactive" and "retrospective" are synonymous, and when applied to a statute
denote a law which operates on matters which occurred
11

before it came into effect or which looks or acts bad:ward from its effectiYe date. Graham Paper Co. r.
Gelmen, 232 l\Io. 155, 59 S. 'V.2d 4<9; Los A nr;eles Rund
and Securities Co. v. Heath, 120 Cal. App. 128. 7 P. 2d

1089.

A case very similar to the proposition presented iP
the instant case is Leon 'l'. Torruella, 99 F.2d 8.5 (1st
Cir. Puerto Rico). This case inn>lved the Organic Act
of Puerto Rico which proYided that no act of the Leg11 •
lature should take effect until ninety days after its
passing unless otherwise directed by a two-thirds Yote
of the Legislature. A statute, making separation of
spouses for seven years a grounds for divorce, was
appro-\·ed by the Puerto Rico Legislature .}fay 9, 1933,
to take effect ninety days after its apprnrnl. In 19.36.
plaintiff sued for divorce under the statute :rnd his 1ri!e
contested the action, alleging noncompliance with the
statute and that the statute was contrary to the Organic
Act of Puerto Rico. She claimed that the retroactire
application of the divorce statute, sought by plaiDtitf.
would render it unconstitutional in violation of the
Organic Act provision. The First Circuit, in rejecti11g
the argument, stated:
"'Ve fa.ii to see wherein Act No . .J.6 in its
enactment fails in any respect to comply \\'ith
provisions of * * * the Organic Act. It was.ap;
proved l\Iay 9th, 1933, a11d expressly pror1<leu
that it should not take effect until ninety days
after its approval, and fully compli~l~ with ihe
[Organic Act prm·isions). This prov1s1on of t!;e
Or!"anic
Act has only
,.,
. to do with of a law not Hi
application."
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Applying this case to the facts in the instant case, it
is apparent that House Bill No. 81 became effective on
Mav 11, 1965, pursuant to Article VI, Section 25, of
the. Utah Constitution. The appellants ask the Court
to disregard this date. It is obvious that this cannot be
llone. In doing so, appellants confuse and seek to
obliterate the difference between an effective date of the
bill and the prospective or retroactive application thereof.
The appellants' contention that the bill by its terms
would not apply to income earned prior to May 11,
1965, simply does not follow. The bill expressly states
that it is applicable to tax returns filed after January
1, 1966, for taxable years commencing on or after J anu:.try l, 1965. By the clear meaning of the statute, if the
taxpayers' taxable year begins anytime after January
L 1965, and prior to .May 11, 1965, his return on personal income must include any income earned during
that period of time, which income is subject to taxation
at the higher rates. Any other construction would be
clearly contrary to the legislative intent and the clear
meaning of the statute. The appellants' arguments to
the contrary are at best specious.
It is submitted that there is no basis for relief on
the theories claimed by the appellants .

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that the appellants seek to strain the
meaning of Article VI, Section 25, of the Constitution
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of the State of Utah. Their argument fails to comprehend the difference between an effective date of an act,
because of its substance, may have retrospectiYe opera
ti on.
It is submitted that the determination of the h;a]
court, upholding the constitutionality of House Bill
No. 81 and determining that it applies to all income
earned subsequent to January 1, 1965, was correct. Tbi1
Court should affirm.

Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN

Attorney General

Attorney for Respondents
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